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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction entered in the
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of
Utah, trial by jury, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was found guilty of one count of distribution
of marijuana in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code
Annotated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks the reversal and dismissal of said judgment
on the basis of entrapment or, in the alternative, for an order
of this Court requiring a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's case consisted of one witness, James Walker
Tauffer.

Mr. Tauffer, an undercover agent for Sanpete County,
l

made the first contact with Sprague on August 19, 1982 at approx
imately 10:00 p.m.
in Manti (T.

78).

The contact was initated by Officer Tauffe 1
Sprague was sitting conversing with a friu"I

nothing illegal was observed by the officer (T.

67 L.

J-91.

Tauffer and Spann had decided to make contacts with various
people in Sanpete County as undercover agents.

They possessed no

prior knowledge of Mr. Sprague nor of the friend he was visiting.
No reason was given as to why Mr. Sprague was isolated, except
that Spann and Tauffer observed Sprague and his friend talking at
the park (T. 67).

The defendant was not discussing marijuana (T.

80 L. 9), nor did he bring up the subject of marijuana.

The

officers possessed no knowledge or suspicion that Sprague was
involved in the distribution of controlled substances.
After some preliminary and informal discussions, Tauffer
brought the subject up asking Sprague if he knew where Tauffer
could get a quarter ounce of marijuana.

Sprague told Tauffer

that his best bet would be to go to Provo (T. 89 L. 19-25 ).
After further discussion, Sprague thereafter told the officer
that he, Sprague, would see what he could do.

Sprague took no

action to obtain any substance as a result of the first contact
by the officers.
After realizing no results from his first contact,
Tauffer sought out Sprague once again,
1982 at 2:46 p.m.

Mr.

this time on August 27,

(Sprague did not initiate either the first or

the second meeting and no communications between the officer and
Sprague had occurred between the first and second meeting.)
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Tauffer,

in company with fellow undercover agent Ed Spann,

went to defendant's place of employment, Mr. Chainsaw,
"'He the defendant maintained a part-time job.

in Manti,

Tauffer and

Spann again brought up the subject of marijuana--asking him about
trying to buy a quarter ounce, if he knew where they could get
some.

Sprague then told them he was going to Gunnison and he

might be able to get some.

A tentative meeting was set in

Ephraim that evening (T. 69 L. 1-9).
Sprague had taken no action regarding the first meeting
(T. 99) and regarding the second meeting, Sprague stated (T. 99
L. 14 through T. 100. L. 16):
A. He met me at the Chain Saw Doctor's.
I was inside
getting down working on a project and he--at first I didn't
know who he was because when I last talked to him it was dark
and I didn't recognize him because it had been some time
since I'd talked with him and I tried to figure out who he
was, you know, I thought he was a customer who'd like to buy
a chain saw or something and I was trying to figure out who
he was and he mentioned something about a quarter, he talked
to me about a quarter.

Q.

A quarter, meaning what?

A.

A quarter of an ounce.

Q.

Go ahead and tell what happened.

A.
Well, we really didn't talk too much about it. I
just told him that I possibly might look around and see if I
could find any for him.

Q.

What is this thing about Gunnison?

A. I told him I heard there was some going around down
there and just, you know, talk around town and I told him
probably I could go down there and find some if there was.

Q.

Did you ever go to Gunnison?

A.

No, I didn't.
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Q. Did you ever have any marijuana on that first time
that you could have given him?
A.

No.

Q.

How about the second time?

A.

No.

When the second meeting brought no results, Tauffer
approached Sprague a third time.

Sprague stated (T.

102 L.

4

through T. 103 L. 21):
A.
I told him there's no way I could find any right
there at the spot, that I'd have to ask somebody when I get
home, off work, or out of--

Q.
Did you have any money that you could have bought,
say, a quarter ounce of marijuana, or a half ounce of
marijuana or more?
A. No.
I get it.

The money I do get is usually spent by the time

Q. Tell us about the third time.
meeting, you met at the Bright Spot?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What happened there?

What happened at that

A. I told--the part I do remember about it is I told
him it could be possible that some, but what I know about, it
would only be a small amount, that it would be a gram, if
any, if the person had any still.
I just said--

Q. You mean you were going to have to go and get it
from somebody else for him?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Alright, go ahead.

What happened then?

A. I left and I come back and handed it to him and, at
first, when I first met him, he asked me how good it was and
I told him I didn't know for sure and I didn't even know
anything about it other than I knew who had it and then I
left and come back and I showed it to him and he bought it.

4

Q.
How much money did you give--how much money did he
give for it?
A.

$10.00.

Q.

Did you keep any of that money for yourself?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Did you take any of that marijuana?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you get any benefit at all from the transaction?

A.

No.

As a result of that occurrence, the information was filed
against the defendant.

Defendant further contends that inadmis-

sible evidence was improperly admitted.

During the trial, the

trial court admitted into evidence a subsequent transaction
between Tauffer and Sprague (T. 111 L. 21 through T. 122 L. 9):

Q. Have you ever been charged with any kind of drug
offense in Utah County? • • •
Q.
My question, my last question was, I believe, Mr.
Sprague, if in Utah County, you have not been charged with
some drug related offenses?
MR. CARTER:
Your Honor, I would like to express at this
time my objection to that question.
THE COURT:

State your objection, please.

MR. CARTER:
My objection is the line of questioning Mr.
Frischknecht is pursuing is irrelevant to this proceeding.
We're trying to determine if there was entrapment at this
point, if there was a subsequent sale, between this officer
and this gentleman in Utah County but we think that's irrelevant to this proceeding because we're trying to determine the
mental attitude of the defendant at that time.
THE COURT:
Your objection's overruled.
This is crossexamination. He has taken the witness stand and the Court
feels that it is relevant . • .
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Q. And what was the situation in Utah County involving
your selling?
A.

It wasn't me that was selling it.

Q.

You didn't sell anything?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

You didn't receive any money?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

were you there?

A.

Can we back up on a phrase?

Q.

Sure.

A.

Can you ask that again, the question?

Q.
The question was:
Weren't you--I believe--weren't
you involved in the sale of drugs in Utah County?
Didn't you
sell up there?

A.

I didn't sell.

It wasn't me selling it.

Q.

were you with somebody who was selling it?

A.

What do you mean by this?

Q. What do you mean, Mr. Sprague, when you say you
weren't selling it? What were you doing?
A. Well, I just knew some people up there who had it,
that they occasionally get it, and I know where it is in Utah
County.

Q. So, you went there and you got it from some people
that you knew there and you sold it to someone; isn't that
right?
A.

I don't understand the question that well.

Q.
You went to Provo where you knew you could get it
from some people and you got--

A.
Q.

Provo?

I wasn't sure about it.
But you did get some drugs from some people in

6

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.
And what did you do with those drugs?
mushrooms; weren't they?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you do with them?

They were

A.
Well, I personally didn't have anything to do with
them but we went back and asked James' partner if he was
interested.
Q.
Now, that's James Tauffer's partner and that was Ed
Spann; wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q.
That counsel has referred to as being another good
looking, well-personalitied gentleman. You went back and you
asked him if he wanted mushrooms?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did he say?

A.

He said, "Yes, if you could get an ounce."

Q.

Did you get some for him?

A.

Well, after while, we went back and forth, yes, we

Q.
Spann?

So you eventually got some and you sold them to Ed

did.

A.

Yes, but there was only three grams.

Q. Only three grams?
for that?

How much money did you receive

A. Well, at first I told him to keep his money and he
said, "Here take this," and I says, "No," and then he would
say, "Take it." I says, "Well, if anything, give me a couple
of dollars to pay for the gas coming up here," but he just
kep on insisting on giving me more.

Q.

How much did you get from him?

A.

$6.00.

Q.

You only wanted two but he gave you six?
7

A.

Yes.

Q.
Now, that incident, Mr. Sprague, resulted in a
charge against you for violation of the drug statutes in Utah
County; isn't that correct?

A.

Yes.

MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

That's all the questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CARTER:
Q.
Let's just tell the truth about that, O.K.? Mr.
Frischknecht has gone into it so why don't you tell the jury
how that episode came about?

A. Well, when I first met James, he waved me down on
the highway between Manti and Ephraim.

Q. Now, the first time you met hirn--are you meaning
after the 29th, after the transaction with the marijuana?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You saw him on the freeway or the--

A. I was just corning home from the game in Ephraim.
just made a trip over there for my Morn, and he waved me down
on the highway, and I turned around and went back and he was
asking me if there was any way we could go to Provo that day
and see if we couldn't get him some marijuana.

Q.

So, he brought up the subject again?

A. Because he wanted--because his brother-in-law was up
there and he was going up north or somewhere and he wanted to
know if he could get it down there because he knew me and he
said he didn't know anybody else.

Q.

Why did you do all of this, Torn?

A.
I don't know,
a friend.

just trying to help him out, and being

Q.

Did you want a friend?

A.

In a way, yes.

Q.

Why?

8

A.

Because the friends I did have were immature.

Q. Your friends had been getting married and you were
somewhat alone or what?
A. Yes. This town, when they grow up, they grow up
slower than the age that you grow up with than they do in the
city.
Q. Now, did you have a difficult time adjusting to the
City of Manti High School?
A.
Yes.
It took me about a couple of years to adjust,
just to where they were.
Q.
So, when this guy came to you and he suggested again
that you take him to Provo, why did you drive all the way to
Provo and go out of your way for him?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Tell us what happened.

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What kind of a car did you drive up there?

A.

A Baja Bug, Volkswagen.

Did you take him to Provo?

Q.
It took more than a couple of dollars worth of gas;
didn't it, to get up there and back?
A.
It took $6.00 to go up there and then I put $2.00 in
it to drive around from Provo to Orem.
Q.
So, you went in the hole on that transaction; did
you not?

A.

Yes, other than--

Q.
And the first time you didn't receive any profit,
you didn't receive anything at all for it; did you?
A.

No.

Q.

You did it completely for the benefit of Mr.

A.

Yes.

Tauffer?

Q. And the second time you even had to shell out a
couple of bucks to do it for Mr. Tauffer?
9

A.

Yes.

Q. Tell us what happened when you once got to the Provo
or Orem area?
A. Well, we met Spann and we talked to him about what
he wanted and he said he wanted--1 can't remember the
quantity he wanted, but he wanted a large amount so he could
sell it up north.
Q.
Did you have any means to do that, to get a large
amount of anything?

A.
Not really because I know my friends don't carry
that much.

Q.

Tell us what happened.

A.
And we went looking for the address and I didn't
know where my friends were living at the time because they'd
just moved out from their old apartment and we found the
house and they were outside talking and stuff, and then they
were pretty well stoned on these mushrooms.

Q.

What happened?

A. Well, we went in and started talking and then my
friends, you know, and we were in the kitchen and standing
there.

Q. Who was in the kitchen?
Tauffer there?

Were Mr. Spann and Mr.

A. Spann, we'd told Spann to meet us at Z.C.M.I. in his
car and I took James with me to my friend's house and
introduced him to my friends and, first they blurped out that
they had some mushrooms right then and there and, after a
minute, they pulled me away from James and asked me how well
I knew him and I said, "He's pretty cool," and they accepted
it at that and we started discussing about how much mushrooms
were and they were--I can't remember all of it.
Q.

Okeh.

A.

But we left there.

Q.

Did Mr. Tauffer buy mushrooms there?

A. No, he didn't. He went back to his partner Spann
and talked to him and he said he wanted to buy an ounce or
something like that.
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Q.

Did Mr. Spann and Mr. Tauffer go back over?

A.

No, just me and Tauffer.

Q.

Okeh.

A.

Went back.

Q.

So, you went in and bought some stuff again?

A.
Well, we didn't buy it at the time because they
said, no, not to sell it to them because they didn't know him
too well and they didn't want any trouble.

Q.

Did you actually get some mushrooms?

A. We went back and they told me that. Tauf fer was in
the car when I come back and we left again and went back to
Spann's and I told him that, you know, that my friends didn't
want to sell it and they didn't really have an ounce with
them so-Q.
But you' re trying to get your friends to sell to
Tauffer and you weren't going to be involved in it at all;
that right?

A.

At first, yes.

Q.

And they wouldn't sell it to Mr. Tauffer alone?

A.

No.

is

Q.
So you went back and then to do a buddy or a
friendship a favor, you went back and bought them some?

A. I went back by myself and they followed me into Orem
and stayed in a K-Mart store and I went back to the house and
1 ied to my friends and told them it was for me and then went
back and gave it to--they gave me $50.00 ahead of time to go
get it.
Q.
Tom, why did you do it for those guys if they didn't
know you that well? And I mean you didn't know them that
well and you'd met him three or four times before, why did
you do it for Tauffer?

A. To try to help out and be a friend to him. I
thought he was going to be a friend to me if, you know, I
tried to help him.

Q.

You let these guys use you because of that?
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A. Well, I do a lot for my friends because it means a
lot to me.
time?

Q.

Have you ever sold any other drugs at any other

A.

No, I haven't.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
REVERSED.
The facts of the present case are strikingly similar to the
facts of State v. Kourbelas,

621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980)

where

the undercover officer brought up the subject, inquired whether
defendant could get some,

the defendant responded,

"I'll see what

I can do," and defendant in Kourbelas gave the undercover agent
his address and telephone number.
In the present case, the defendant was initially contacted by
the undercover officer on the 19th day of August,

1982.

The

undercover agent brought up the subject of selling marijuana.
The agent then asked the defendant if he could get him some and
the defendant gave the agent basically the same answer as given
in Kourbelas.
Approximately one week transpired wherein the defendant made
no attempt to secure any marijuana for the undercover agent.

The

agent then sought out the defendant again to locate the agent
some marijuana.

Mr. Sprague then responded that he would see

what he could do and set up a tentative meeting in Ephraim.
defendant made no effort to acquire any marijuana and thereby

12

The

produced no results for

the undercover agent.

In the present case,
time,

the undercover agent,

for the third

sought out the defendant to obtain some marijuana although

rlefendant did not produce the marijuana on the previous two
occasions.

The undercover agent wanted substantially more

marijuana but the defendant was only able to produce a small
amount, one gram.
individual.

The marijuana was obtained from another

The defendant received no benefit but did it only at

the insistence of the officer.
Section 76-2-303, Utah Code Annotated, provides that it is a
"defense if the actor was entrapped in committing the offense."
The section provides:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induced
the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(Emphasis added).
In two recent cases before the Court on the issue of
entrapment, the Court has held that the defense of entrapment was
met.

In State v. Taylor,

599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Court

specified that an objective test was to be applied to determine
if entrapment had occurred--the focus of attention being on the
police officer's conduct rather than the defendant's predisposition or the lack thereof.
In evaluating the course of conduct between the government
representative and the defendant,

the transactions leading up to

the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant
13

and the response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be
considered in judging what the effect of the governmental agent'c
conduct would be on the defendant.

State v. Taylor_,

The Court found that under the facts of
ment occurred.

Sll[-'''-

that entrap-

The female police agent, Stubbs, and the defen-

dant had cohabitated until the first week of July.

curing the

time they engaged in this illicit, intimate relationship, they
were both heroin addicts who procured and injected the drugs in a
spirit of togetherness.
separate dwellings,

Although they subsequently occupied

they remained close friends.

Stubbs

submitted she shared defendant's bed some time in September, the
same month she contacted the defendant for the purpose of making
a controlled buy to obtain evidence to convict him.

The defen-

dant was an addict who had recently undergone detoxification,

had

personally experienced the agonies of withdrawal and could
empathize with this girl he loved who pleaded for his assistance
in locating heroin.
In State v. soroushairn,

571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977),

the

evidence showed that a police officer had enrolled at the same
college as attended by the defendant for the sole purpose of
finding those students who distributed drugs and marijuana.
The narcotics officer lived at home but maintained a room in
the college dormatory where the students believed he resided.

He

secured marijuana and threw "pot parties" in his room and in his
car.

He fraternized with the students.

He made friends with a

student and urged him to obtain marijuana or, failing that, to
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put him (the officer) in contact with someone who could secure
t

lie

substance.
The student introduced the officer to the defendant and they

also became friends.

When asked at trial if he had any indica-

tion that the defendant was an individual who would get involved
in

selling marijuana,

the officer replied,

"I had no indication."

The officer took the student and the defendant in his own
automobile to a place in town where he had been directed by the
student.

He gave the appellant $20.00 and asked him to get two

bags of marijuana.

The appellant went into the house and

returned with the two bags and delivered them to the officer.
For almost a week thereafter,

the officer visited the appellant

and importuned him to get more marijuana.
On all occasions,

the defendant told the officer that the

"contact" did not have any.

Finally,

on the eighth day after the

first buy, the appellant, again at the importuning of the
officer, rode with him to the home of the "contact" where the
officer gave the defendant $40.00 and requested that he buy four
packages of marijuana.
The defendant brought two bags and $20.00 back to the car
saying that the wife of the contact told him that was all they
could sell him.

The officer claimed that the two bags were for

someone else and asked the defendant to try to get the other two
bags.

on this second try,

the defendant managed to get them.

They drove to the defendant's room where the marijuana was handed
over to the officer.

Thereafter,
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the officer gave to the defen-

dant two or three joints as a courtesy.
The Court held that the defendant had been entrapped.

The

Court stated:
He manifested no indication of being in the mariJuana
business; but at the importuning of the undercover officer,
did act as his agent to buy from the real seller.
There is
nothing to suggest that the appellant would ever have dealt
in marijuana except at the instance of and for the benefit of
the officer.
(Emphasis added).
We think that the entrapment so permeated the entire matter
that it also wou1d include the two joints given to the
appellant by the narcotics officer.
Most recently in State v. Kourbelas,
that the defendant had been entrapped.

supra,

the Court found

On June 13,

1979,

defendant and some friends were boating on Lake Powell.

the
At that

time, Mark Nelson was working as an undercover narcotics agent
for the San Juan County Sheriff's Office and had been hired as an
assistant manager of the gas dock at the marina.

When the defen-

dant and his friends brought their houseboat into the marina for
refueling,

there was some problem about the gas mixture and

Mr. Nelson intervened to help resolve it.

In his conversations

with the defendant, Nelson brought up the subject of selling
marijuana.

He told the defendant that there could be "a lot of

money made down here if I had some way of getting some."
then asked:
get some?"

Nelson

"Can you help me get some or do you know where I can
When the defendant replied:

"I'll see what I can

do,• Nelson asked for his name, address and telephone number.
The defendant gave that information to him and told Nelson to get
in touch.
About two weeks later, Nelson telephoned the defendant,
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reminded him of their conversation at Lake Powell and asked him

if he could get some marijuana.

According to Nelson, the defen-

Jant said he could and asked how much he wanted.
"Four or five pounds."

Nelson stated:

The defendant said he would call back

later that afternoon; however, he did not do so.
Nelson called the defendant two more times on June 30.
Nelson said,

"Hey,

I hate to keep bothering you like this," and

the defendant responded that it was "no problem at all."

Nelson

called the next morning and asked once more if the defendant
could sell some marijuana.

Defendant promised to call back.

Later that same day, the defendant reported that he had not been
able to contact one "LaDell" who might have some marijuana,
that he would keep trying.

but

Nelson called back three days later.

The defendant stated that he had spoken with LaDell and there
were two pounds of marijuana available.

They discussed the price

and how the defendant could pay LaDell.

When they met, the

defendant and Nelson used some marijuana and consumed some beer.
After the money was exchanged,

the defendant was placed under

arrest.
The Court held:
These facts are significant: That it was Mr. Nelson who
first suggested the purchase of marijuana from the defendant;
that after two weeks had passed, it was he who renewed the
contact and the request which he followed up by calling the
defendant at least five times and attempting to purchase the
marijuana. This is to be considered together with the fact
that there is no evidence that the defendant had previously
possessed or dealt in the drug.
Based on those facts, we
think that the above quoted statement of the trial judge
relating to whether it was a police conduct which induced
this crime is a "crucial question, not easy to answer ••
was a well advised observation.
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It is our opinion that, if the rule as to the presumption of
innocence is fairly and properly applied, there necessarily
exists a reasonable doubt as to whether the offense committed
was the product of the defendant's initiative and desire, or
was induced by the persistent request of Mr. Nelson. ---,z;:ccordingly, it is our conclusion that the defendant's conv1ct1on
should be reversed.
It is important to note the citation of the Kourbelas court
to State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975), where the Supreme
Court indicated:
When it is known or suspected that a person is engaged in
criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is not
entrapment to provide an opportunity for such person to carry
out his criminal intention.
However:
• • • it is not the proper function of law enforcement
officers, either themselves or by use of decoys or undercover
agents, to induce persons who otherwise would be law-abiding
into the commission of a crime.
Defendant submits that it was the officer who made the first
contact and brought up the subject of marijuana, and it was the
officer who made the second and third contacts when the first
contact proved fruitless.

There is no evidence that the defen-

dant was in the business of selling marijuana and the defendant
manifested no indications of such.
acts suggested by the officer,

The defendant performed the

not for the defendant's benefit,

but only as a favor and to the sole benefit of the officer and
only upon the insistence and perseverance of the officer was the
defendant able to obtain an extremely small amount from another
person.
If the presumption of innocence is to be given its fair and
practical application, a presumption of innocence exists.
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POINT II
OVER THE OBJECTION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, THE COURT ALLOWED INTO
lcVIOENCE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND CHARGED
WITH A SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE OF SELLING A NARCOTIC SUBSTANCE.
Courts in the United States have applied two different tests
to the defense of entrapment.

The U. S. Supreme Court applies

what is called the subjective test.
defendant's intent,
Hampton v. U.

s.,

96

This test focuses on a

or predisposition,

to commit a crime.

S.Ct. 1646 (1976 ).

A defendant who was

predisposed to commit a crime will not be acquitted in spite of
the police officer's inducive conduct.
The second and more recent standard is the objective test.
Several states have adopted this test,
Michigan and Utah.

including California,

The Utah Legislature adopted it in 1973 (see

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303).

The Utah Supreme Court

approved the objective test in State v. Taylor,

supra.

The defendant's state of mind is not the issue;

the focus of

attention should be the officer's conduct, and when the police
conduct falls below a set level of propriety, the defendant is to
be acquitted.

State v. Taylor,

NW2d 196 (Mich. Ct. App.

1980);

supra;

People v. Wisneski,

and People v. Barraga,

292

591 P.2d

94 7 (Cal. 1979).
Since the subjective test emphasizes a defendant's predisposition, courts have allowed the prosecution to submit evidence of
other crimes committed by the defendant.

This is an exception to

the general rule against allowing such evidence.
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The law allows

it in this case because when defendant pleads entrapment,

the

vital issue is whether the accused was predisposed to commit the
crime; evidence of other crimes being proof of predisposition.
See State v. Taylor,

supra,

p.

500,

and State v. Perk ins,

4 J:i

P.2d 50 (Utah 1967).
The entrapment exception (permitting evidence of other
crimes) is not justified when the court is applying the objective
test of entrapment.

Predisposition is not an issue.

stated in State v. Taylor,

supra,

As was

evidence of other crimes is not

permissible in a trial where the objective test governs.
The Utah Legislature anticipated the problem and resolved it
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(6), which states:
[i]n any hearing before a judge or jury where the
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial where
the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past
convictions for felonies
"
The question presented by this appeal asks whether Utah Code
Annotated, Section 76-2-303(6) precludes evidence of unproven
criminal or civil wrongs occurring subsequent to the date of the
charged offense but prior to trial.

The officer contacted the

defendant subsequent to August of 1982 and procured another
purchase of a controlled substance.
over

Said evidence was admitted

objection.
Scholars have interpreted words such as "prior" and "past" to

refer to any other crimes committed before the trial,

both those

committed before the indicted offense and those committed after
it.

See Roth W., Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts:
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A Diagrammatic Approach,
Jefferson,
,, I

California Evidence Bench Book,

c.o State v. Gibson,

297 (pp.
§21.4

565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1978 );

P.2d 880 (Utah 1978);
1969 ).

9 Pepperdine L.R.

and State v. Lopez,

297-298);

(1972).

B.

See

State v. Daniels,

451 P.2d 772 (Utah

(Gibson and Daniels both involved subsequent offenses yet

applied precedent set in cases ruling on prior offenses).
Jiminez v. State,

582 SW2d 91 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1979); Rios v.

State, 557 SW2d 198 (Arkansas 1977); Morrison v. State,
939 (Tex. Crim. App.

1947 );

See

and Evidence Benchbook,

202 SW2d

supra.

The interpretation is justified when one considers the
prejudice such rules are intended to prevent.
The purpose of the rule is to forbid and prevent the convict ion of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence that
he has committed other crimes, and to preclude the inference
that because he had committed other crimes he was more liable
to commit the crime for which he is indicted and tried. In
other words, it is not competent to prove that the accused
committed other crimes of a like nature, for the purpose of
showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged
in the indictment, for ordinarily such proof will not shed
any light upon the crime with which he stands charged • • • ;
one may be a habitual criminal and yet be innocent of the
crime for which he is indicted and being tried.
(29 AmJur2d,
Evidence, Section 320).
The effect of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(6) was to
dissolve the exception permitting evidence of other crimes when
defendant pleads entrapment.
The provisions of Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, dictate
that evidence of other wrongs are inadmissable with exceptions
inapplicable here.

Presently,

the only justification for the

admission of past offenses is impeachment.
strictly limited to convictions.
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However, such use is

Unproven criminal or civil

wrongs are inadmissable [Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2303 ( b) l.
Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, limits the scope ot
inquiry upon cross-examination to previous felony convictions.
It states:

" • • • But a witness must answer as to the fact of

his previous conviction of felony."
U.2d 166,

382 P.2d 407,

See also State v. Kazda,

14

finding it error to allow an officer to

testify as to a conversation with the defendant concerning other
unproven charges,

and State v. Hodges,

30 U.2d 367,

517 P.2d 1322

(1974).
Jiminez, Rios, and Morrison, supra,
the one at bar.

In each case,

involved cases similar to

the Court concluded that permit-

ting evidence of defendant's subsequent offenses was prejudicial
error.
Under the standards established in those cases and in Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 55,

and for the reasons discussed above,

the trial court was in error when it permitted evidence of defendant's subsequent offense to taint the proceeding;

defendant was

prejudiced in the jurors' minds and was submitted to the hardship
of defending against an uncharged offense.
fair

trial.

He was thus denied a

The verdict arrived at in the trial court should be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
The subsequent transactions between the defendant and Officer
Taffer were improperly admitted into trial and require a reversal
of the judgment and an order of new trial for the defendant
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herein.
The facts as set forth herein relating to entrapment require
cµversal and dismissal.

A young man, manifesting no indication

of being in the business of selling, sold a small amount of
marijuana upon the insistence and importuning of the officer.
The defendant did not benefit by the transaction but acted as an
agent of the officer to the sole benefit of the officer.
Further, the defendant submits that the facts of the case
support a finding that the defendant was entrapped, or at the
least,

that there was a reasonable doubt as to the officer's

entrapping the defendant into committing the crime and thereby
requiring a reversal of the judgment entered herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

___jl1__

day of August, 1983.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to the
Utah State Attorney General, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent,
State Capitol Building, Room 236, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
postage prepaid, this
day of August, 1983.
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